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Abstract
This paper studies through an agency model the problem of concealing an illegal activity which
benefit the principal. The agent can exert an effort that negatively affects the likelihood of detection.
We model such behavior with the assumption that the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk
averse. Two opposite legal regimes are considered: in the first only the principal is strictly liable; in
the second, only the agent is. We show that shifting the liability upon the agent, while the monetary
sanction and the probability of detection are kept constant, reduces the principal’s net benefit thus
favoring deterrence of wrongdoing. However, the agent’s effort in cheating can either increase or
decrease. For a specifi model we are able to characterize cases in which a reduction in cheating
prevails, and shifting the liability upon the agent has clear-cut beneficia effects on compliance.
1. Introduction
In this paper the problem of illegal activity perpetrated by corporations is examined.
Public opinion often considers corporations responsible for damage stemming from illegal
activity in the field of environment, taxation, financia markets, social risk, and so forth. We
will examine some facets of this problem in the simplifie framework of a principal-agent
model.
We consider a principal who stands to benefi from an illegal activity and needs the
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cooperation of an agent to implement it.1 The extent of the agent’s cooperation influence the
likelihood of detection. Adopting the standard approach of the agency model, we will term
this cooperation as the agent’s “effort” in covering up. A real world example might be a case
of tax evasion by a corporation,2 accomplished through manipulation of the accounting. The
bookkeeper’s skill and effort in cheating can affect the probability of detection.3
Agents who can either facilitate or disrupt misconduct (by withholding their cooperation)
are called “gatekeepers” by Kraakman (1986). Sanctions (either civil or criminal) provided
by the law upon gatekeepers may be seen as devices for keeping principals honest. Is
gatekeeper liability the best way of curbing illegal behavior, or would providing sanctions
directly upon the principal work better? Many aspects of this problem have already been
explored (Kraakman [1986]). With reference to the specifi issue of covering-up corporate
crimes, Arlen (1994) has studied the case—symmetric to the one considered here—in which
a crime is committed in the pursuit of the agent’s self interest. In this case, strict corporate
liability may induce corporations to prevent and sanction agents’ crimes, but it could also
have perverse effects.4 That is, corporations could reduce monitoring whenever costs (due to
the liability that would ensue from the detection of the employee’s violations that cannot be
eradicated) are higher than benefit (in terms of deterrence of the potential wrongdoer). The
threat of sanctions may in fact induce the principal of the potential perpetrator of an illegal
activity to prevent crime, but it could also sometimes induce her to help the wrongdoer in a
more careful covering up of the misdeed. This paper examines another perspective of this
problem, the case in which illegal activity is conducted in the pursuit of the principal’s
interest, with special attention to the consequences of different attitudes toward risk of the
principal and the agent.5
For the sake of simplicity, two extreme alternatives are modeled: that is, either the
principal or the agent is strictly liable, while the monetary sanction and the probability of
1 The corporation owners, who are the decision makers, play the role of the principal. The principal-agent
model closely describes the case of a sole-owner corporation. However, it can apply also to multiple-owners or
even to publicly traded corporations, as long as incentives align managers’ behavior to shareholder interests.
2 Other examples are fraud-on-the-market securities fraud, fraud on the government, bribery, violation of
regulatory requirements, waste disposal without permission, and so forth. We consider affirmativ wrongful acts,
committed by the agent because the corporation so desires. According to Cohen (1991), the majority of corporate
crimes are “affirmative.
3 In the fiel of taxation, the agent’s effort in concealing evasion can be extremely problematic. For example,
Reinganum and Wilde (1991) note that raw evidence suggests a link between taxpayer use of preparers or
practitioners and noncompliance. They report US data that show higher noncompliance, both as a percentage of
number of reports and as a percentage of the amount of the reported tax, for taxpayers who resorted to third-party
assistance. This happens in a legal regime in which the main penalties are provided for the evading taxpayer, but
some are also imposed on the practitioner. Erard (1997) quotes survey evidence that indicates that some tax
practioners believe that they are able to prevent detection of tax evasion. The same author, using a 1982 IRS
TCMP data file estimates a higher success by examiners in detecting deliberate evasion on self-prepared returns
than on paid-prepared returns.
4 On this topic, see also Arlen and Kraakman (1997).
5 The role of gatekeepers has often been examined with reference to tax compliance. Most models are based
on the approach of game theory (e.g., Reinganum and Wilde [1991]). Risk neutrality of all the parties involved
is the standard assumption (e.g., Klepper et al. [1991]).
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detection function remain the same. Even if actual legal regimes often provide rules for
sharing liability,6 the study of extreme alternatives may shed light upon the main issues
involved.7 In order to focus specificall upon the liability regime, it is also assumed that main
enforcement parameters (sanctions and the probability of detection) are given.8
A rule providing for the principal’s liability seems justifie both on moral grounds, with
reference to the retributive role of sanctions (since the illegal activity considered benefit the
principal), and on efficienc grounds (since the principal can provide incentives for the agent
to choose legal behavior). If, however, the principal is a corporation, then it is a person only
in legal fiction without a definabl mind or intentions. The applicability of the retributive
theory of sanctions can thus be questioned in this case (Byam [1982], Khanna [1996]),
although efficienc considerations pertaining to the deterrence of future wrongdoing are still
relevant.9zct;FN9 The alternative approach, which envisages the agent as liable, may also
have moral justifications The agent, who is skilled either on the grounds of technical, legal
or deontological rules, may have an even clearer idea than the principal that an activity is
illegal.10
We will focus however on efficienc problems. It has been argued from this point of view
that, according to the Coase theorem, liability rules are irrelevant, as long as costless side
payments and monetary compensations can be used to neutralize the effects of the liability
rule on payoff allocation. It is widely recognized, however, that market imperfections may
imply that liability rules do matter. For example, agents may be potentially insolvent with
reference to substantial judgments against them (Sykes [1984]). This fact could reduce their
incentive to avoid wrongdoing if they are personally liable.
In this paper we assume, again for the sake of simplicity, that both the corporation and the
agent can bear unlimited liability. However, in our model, liability rules matter because of
transaction costs. We assume that the agreements between the principal and the agent
6 For some wrongdoings (such as fraud) sharing of the negative consequences of detection is likely to occur
even when only the agent is liable for sanctions, given that the principal loses the benefi as soon as the agent is
detected. In other cases (e.g., violations pertaining to health and safety, pollution regulations, price regulations,
political contribution to foreign governments), when the agent alone is liable, the principal sometimes keeps the
benefi after detection.
We explored several examples to test the validity of a more general approach, which also considers the case
of liability sharing in various degrees between the principal and the agent. We discovered that the main results
go unchanged, while the theoretical treatment would require significantl heavier formalization.
For the sake of simplicity, we model illicit conduct as one-shot, thus not taking into account problems
pertaining to the possible continuation of the wrongdoing.
7 For a discussion about the use of fine upon employees as partial substitutes for sanctions upon corporations,
see Polinsky and Shavell (1993).
8 Note that this approach becomes necessary when constraints pertaining to available resources, need for
marginal deterrence, and so forth (see, e.g., Stigler [1970]) restrict the number of instruments that can be tuned
to secure optimal enforcement.
9 However, according to Fischel and Sykes (1996), with reference to corporations, deterrence should never be
unconditional, that is, aimed at completely eradicating crime.
10 From an equity point of view, the agent may be poorer than the principal, and society may assign a higher
weight to her utility. However, the reverse case may also arise. For example, a legal advisor may be richer than
the owner of a small fir with limited assets.
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pertaining to the complete or partial offsetting of the effects of the liability rule cannot be
reached or enforced, or, equivalently, that transaction costs of these deals within the agency
are prohibitively high. Moreover, it is impossible to buy insurance against sanctions. These
are, again, extreme assumptions that are intended to provide insight about more realistic
intermediate cases.
Illicit deals generally imply sheer difficultie in negotiating actions and compensation. In
the subsequent analysis it is assumed, however, that these difficultie do not preclude the
drafting and carrying out of an agency contract, provided that the agent’s effort is observ-
able.11 This framework, with inevitable simplifications should depict the fact that, on the one
hand, in many field illicit deals do take place and illicit markets do work;12 and that on the
other hand, detection of wrongdoing would prevent the resorting to legal devices for further
enforcement of the contract, and would also disrupt the functioning of self-enforcement or
trust mechanisms.13 Thus, it is assumed that the agent’s remuneration cannot be made
conditional on the outcome (i.e., whether the wrongdoing is detected or not).
As far as risk aversion is concerned, according to standard agency theory, it is assumed
that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. The literature provides many
justification for this assumption: for example, a stockholder principal can neutralize risks
through the diversificatio of his portfolio. The generality of this assumption may of course
be questioned, in particular with reference to illegal activities. Agency models which
consider problems of substitutability or jointness of the principal and agent liability (see e.g.,
Chu & Qian [1995], Polinsky & Shavell [1993], Shavell [1997], Arlen [1994]) have,
however, generally assumed risk neutrality of both,14 and only put forth some conjecture
about the effect of the agent’s risk aversion.15 In this paper the consequences of shifting
liability from a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent are examined in depth.
Liability shifts are often explained using the “deep pocket” argument, that is, identifying
the subject who is more vulnerable to the threat of monetary sanction, when the other party
has insufficien assets. Risk aversion may, however, provide a different kind of vulnerability.
Even if both parties have sufficien assets, when the agent is liable, the sanction is placed
upon the subject who is most damaged by it (being risk averse); as a consequence, the
decisions of the principal regarding illegal behavior are negatively influenced through the
increase in the cost of compensating the agent.
Agent’s liability may, however, give rise to efficienc losses. Posner (1992) notes that a
11 Standard agency models assume both uncertainty about the outcome and nonobservability of the agent’s
effort. In the case studied in this paper, as will become clear in the following, the firs assumption alone is enough
to originate a non trivial problem.
12 According to Tirole (1992), the assumption of enforceability of side (illicit) contracts has the advantage of
allowing the use of classical contract theory, while offering a realistic description.
13 It is often assumed (see Tirole [1992]) that side transfers are not always possible, but instead somehow
constrained (for example by technology).
14 Risk neutrality is also assumed in the literature on disclosure, concealment or forgery of information by
agents, as in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
15 For example, Polinsky and Shavell (1993) and Shavell (1997) maintain that risk averse liable agents will
tend to exercise more effort than risk neutral ones.
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fin imposed with a given probability upon a risk averse agent gives him a disutility in excess
with respect to that suffered in the case of risk neutrality, which is not translated into revenue
for the state. The same problem is pointed out by Yitzhachi (1987), who assumes risk averse
taxpayers, and speaks of an “excess burden” of tax evasion. With reference to corporations,
according to Kraakman (1984), managers and employees are undiversifie risk bearers
(having their assets concentrated) and thus are characterized by a risk-averse bias. Shifting
liability upon them is costly and could also produce overdeterrence, as they may refuse
running even minor risks, pertaining to legal but ambiguously regulated behavior.
However, government could prefer to bear some efficienc loss to achieve “the highest
possible degree of voluntary compliance”.16 Enforcing law upon risk averse agents could
then be a way of securing a degree of compliance that might not otherwise be achieved. We
demonstrate, in fact, that the legal regime in which the agent is liable always reduces the
principal’s net benefit thus involving at the margin some exit from illegal behavior.17
On the other hand, one cannot exclude that shifting the responsibility upon the agent
involves a greater cheating effort, and thus the public sector is faced by greater problems in
repressing illegal activity. On a specifi model, however, we are able to characterize the cases
in which the agent’s effort in covering up is lower than in the legal regime in which the
principal is liable. When these circumstances occur, shifting liability upon the agent has
clear-cut beneficia effects on compliance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the agency model is introduced and
optimal solutions are calculated for the two legal regimes (i.e., either when the principal or
the agent is liable). Section 3 shows that, given the principal’s and the agent’s different
attitudes toward risk, the principal net benefi is always lower under the second legal regime.
Section 4 is dedicated to a specifi (exponential) model. For this peculiar case, conditions are
put forth under which the second legal regime is the most effective in the repression of
wrongdoing. Finally, Section 5 reports the conclusions.
2. A principal-agent model under full information
In this section we set up two different principal-agent models describing the optimal
behavior in implementing some illegal action. In the firs model, strict liability is assumed
only on the principal for any action performed by the agent, while in the second scenario the
agent bears all the risks involved in possible detection. First we introduce notation and the
assumptions necessary for the description of both cases.
16 American Bar Association on Taxpayer Compliance, quoted in Reinganum and Wilde (1991).
17 Moreover, as effort devoted to cheating is generally a waste of resources, discouraging it should also
increase efficiency and mitigate the efficienc loss due to the risk bearing by risk averse agents. On concealment
inefficienc see Cremer and Gahvari (1994).
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2.1. Notation and assumptions
The principal, who is assumed to be risk neutral, may reap benefi that amounts to B from
illegal behavior. Illegal activity is implemented by an agent18 who is paid for her effort to
negatively affect the likelihood of detection. The agent is assumed to be risk-averse and
receives utility from a remuneration r paid by the principal and faces a “disutility” due to the
cost of the effort x. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the agent’s total utility has the
separable form19 u(r) 2 d(x). Her reservation utility is denoted by u0. Furthermore, we
assume that the principal can observe the effort x performed by the agent and has a
reservation utility of p0.
Let p(x) be the probability of being detected in performing the illegal activity and S the
pecuniary sanction applied if offense is detected. Both the principal and agent know the
function p(x). To prove our results we need the following assumptions:
– (A1) B . 0, S . 0, u0 . 0 and p0 . 0;
– (A2) u:R 3 R is differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave;
– (A3) d:R1 3 R is differentiable, strictly increasing and weakly convex;
– (A4) p:R1 3 R is differentiable, strictly decreasing, strictly convex and 0 , p(x) ,
1 for all x;
– (A5) u(0) 2 d(0) # u0 and d91(0) 5 0.
In (A2) we use standard assumptions for a risk averse agent utility function. In (A4) we
assume that detection is neither certain nor impossible, and the probability p(x) of
detection is decreasing in effort. Assumption (A5) is needed to obtain interior solutions:
the firs inequality means that the agent can at most obtain her reservation utility by
performing no effort and receiving nothing as remuneration.
2.2. The case where the principal is liable
In the firs model the principal wants to maximize her expected net benefi
Ep~ x, r! 5 @1 2 p~ x!#~B 2 r! 1 p~ x!~B 2 r 2 S!
5 B 2 r 2 p~ x!S
subject to two constraints: the agent participation constraint and a “moral” constraint. Thus
the problem of the principal is
18 It assumed that the principal can never dispense with the agent altogether, either for organizational or legal
reasons (e.g., only the agent can certify or sign documents etc.). The focus in this paper is thus on a side-contract
between the principal and the agent about covering-up. In a more general setting one should also consider the
likely interactions with the main contract that links the agent to the principal (e.g., the agent could be an
employee, an outside consultant, etc.). On this topic see Kraakman (1986).
19 It is straightforward to extend Proposition 2 to the case where utility is described by any function H(x,r)
decreasing in x, strictly increasing and strictly concave in r. This general model has been tackled by Privileggi
et al. (1998).
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p1 5 maxx,r @B 2 r 2 p~ x!S#
s.t.~i!u~r! 2 d~ x! $ u0 and
~ii!B 2 r 2 p~ x!S $ p0. (1)
Constraint (ii) may be interpreted as follows: if the expected net benefi equals zero, then the
principal chooses not to undertake any illegal action. Clearly, such a constraint becomes
determinant in the choice of the principal: if r and p(x)S are large enough, legal behavior will
ensue. Note that p(x)S is the expected value of the sanction if the effort in hiding the offense
is x: p(x)S 5 Ex(S).
2.3. The case where the agent is liable
Now let us assume that the legal regime changes. The agent can be punished with the
same sanction previously applied to the principal, and the principal is no longer liable.
As the possibility of resorting to insurance (provided either by the principal or by a third
party) has been excluded by assumption, the agent will consider the sanction as a cost
or loss component, to be kept in mind when deciding whether to accept a contract which
does not entail reimbursement of the sanction in case of detection.
Provided that the agent behaves according to the expected utility approach, in the legal
regime where the agent is liable, her utility is
U~ x,r! 5 @1-p~ x!#@u~r! 2 d~ x!# 1 p~ x!@u~r 2 S! 2 d~ x!#
5 @1 2 p~ x!#u~r! 1 p~ x!u~r 2 S! 2 d~ x!
5 u~r! 2 p~ x!@u~r! 2 u~r 2 S!# 2 d~ x!. (2)
Under this new legal regime, the principal is no longer liable, and is therefore not
interested in the effort of hiding the illegal action. Net benefi will be maximized indepen-
dently of the effort x performed by the agent. Hence, the principal problem under this legal
regime is:
p2 5 maxr ~B 2 r!
s.t.~i!U~ x,r! $ u0.
~ii! x [ arg max
x
U~ x,r! and
~iii!B 2 r $ p0. (3)
Constraint (ii) shows that, while in the previous legal regime the only contract available to
the agent requires an amount of effort chosen by the principal, in this case the agent chooses
a level of effort which maximizes her expected utility.
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2.4. Characterization of optima
Under Assumptions (A1)–(A5) it is straightforward to obtain conditions which charac-
terize solutions of problems (1) and (3). To exclude trivial cases, both constraint (ii) in (1)
and constraint (iii) in (3) are assumed to hold with strict inequality.
Proposition 1: Under (A1)–(A5), the unique optimal solutions of problems (1) and (3)
are two pairs (x1,r1) and (x2,r2) respectively such that
H u~r1! 2 d~ x1! 5 u02 p9~ x1!S 5 d‘~ x1!u9~r1! (4)
H @1 2 p~ x2!#u~r2! 1 p~ x2!u~r2 2 S! 2 d~ x2! 5 u02 p9~ x2!@u~r2! 2 u~r2 2 S!# 5 d9~ x2! (5)
Furthermore x1 . 0, r1 . 0, x2 . 0 and r2 . 0.
Proof: By concavity and differentiability assumptions, the unique solution (x1,r1) of prob-
lem (1) is completely characterized by K. T. conditions, which lead to (4). The firs equation
in (5) follows frommonotonicity of both the objective function and the functionU(x,r) with
respect to r which implies that constraint (i) in (3) is binding. Weak convexity of d(z) and
strict convexity of p(z) imply strict concavity of function U(z,r) (see last line in (2)); hence,
for each given r, FOC expressed in the second equation of (5) is necessary and sufficien
for optima. Finally, strict monotonicity of functions d(z) and p(z) plus assumption (A5) are
sufficien for interiority of both (x1,r1) and (x2,r2). n
The firs equations in both (4) and (5) imply that, when the principal maximizes her expected
net benefit the agent receives her reservation utility. The second equation in (4) establishes that,
at the optimum, the marginal benefi of the principal due to a reduction of the expected sanction
must equal the marginal rate of substitution between the effort disutility and the reward utility of
the agent. The second equation in (5) simply states that the incremental benefi of the agent must
be equal to her marginal disutility at the optimal effort x2.
Thanks to strict monotonicity of u(z), from the firs equality in (4), the optimal remuner-
ation received by the agent for the effort performed x1 is:
r1 5 u
21@u0 1 d~ x1!#.
Since effort is observable, the principal can fi the contract with the agent by setting the
payment function:
w~ x! 5 Hr1 5 u21@u0 1 d~ x1!# if x 5 x10 otherwise.
Similarly, since U(x,z) is strictly increasing for each fixe x, the firs equation in (5) leads
to:
r2 5 U
21~ x2, u0!,
188
where, for each fixe x, U21(x,z) denotes the inverse function of U(x,z). Since the agent is
liable, the principal is not interested in the effort performed by the agent and a contract will
be set such that the payment function is:
w~ x! : r2 5 U21~ x2, u0!.
3. The “moral” constraint effect of the agent’s liability
Given the setting of Section 2, we are now ready to prove that when liability is charged
on the agent rather than on the principal, there is a monetary disincentive in pursuing illegal
initiatives: that is, the net benefi earned by the principal under the legal regime of Section
2.3 is always smaller than the net benefi of the case in Section 2.2.
Proposition 2: Under (A1)–(A5),
p2 , p1, (6)
where p1 and p2 are define in (1) and (3) respectively.
Proof: By assumption (A2), (2) may be rewritten as
U~ x, r! 5 u@r 2 p~ x!S# 2 d~ x! 2 «~ x, r!,
where
«~ x,r! 5 u@r 2 p~ x!S# 2 $@1 2 p~ x!#u~r! 1 p~ x!u~r 2 S!% . 0
represents the cost, in terms of utility, of the risk of being liable in case of detection, which
is strictly positive for all x $ 0 and for all r since, under (A1)–(A4), u(z) is strictly concave,
S . 0 and 0 , p(x) , 1.
Hence, the firs equation in (5) can be rewritten as follows:
u@r2 2 p~ x2!S# 5 u0 1 «~ x2, r2! 1 d~ x2!.
By applying the inverse function u21(z) to both sides we have:
r2 5 u
21@u0 1 «~ x2, r2! 1 d~ x2!# 1 p~ x2!S.
Therefore, the following holds:
p2 5 B 2 r2
5 B 2 u21@u0 1 «~ x2,r2! 1 d~ x2!# 2 p~ x2!S
, B 2 u21@uo 1 d~ x2!# 2 p~ x2!S
# max
x$0
$B 2 u21@u0 1 d~ x!# 2 p~ x!S%
5 p1,
where strict inequality holds as «(x2,r2) . 0 and u
21(z) is strictly increasing. n
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An important consequence of (6) is that, under the new legal regime, the “moral”
constraint (ii) could no longer be satisfie and the principal problem (3) could turn out to
have no solution while (1) may have. In other words, under a legal regime that charges the
agent rather than the principal for committing an illegal activity, the principal may fin that
the same illegal activity that was profitabl under the previous legal regime is no longer
profitable
The role played by the difference in attitudes toward risk exhibited by the principal and
the agent should be evident: strict concavity of utility function u(z) versus linearity of the
principal preferences plays the major role in reducing profi opportunities of the latter under
the second legal regime.20 Clearly, by assuming linearity of function u(z), that is risk
neutrality also of the agent, the optimal effort turns out to be the same under both legal
regimes, while the difference between the optimal remunerations is exactly the same amount
as the expected sanction.
Unfortunately, systems (4) and (5) are not enough to establish general conditions under
which effort x2 turns out to be larger or smaller than effort x1. In the next section we discuss
a particular model where effort x2 may be either greater or smaller than effort x1, depending
on the magnitude of parameters involved.
4. A specific case: the exponential model
Let the functions discussed in Section 2 be the following:
2u~r! 5 1 2 e2ar, a . 0;
2d~ x! 5 b~ex 2 1!, b . 0;
2p~ x! 5 ge2x, 0 , g , 1.
Moreover, let 0 , u0 , 1, S . 0 and B . 0 be given, and assume for simplicity that B is
large enough to let constraint (ii) in problem (1) always be satisfied 21 The interpretation of
the parameters a, b, g is immediate: a denotes the (constant) absolute risk aversion of the
agent, b characterizes the magnitude of the disutility function of the agent22 and g is a rough
indicator of the “average” probability of detection.23
20 Proposition 2 is consistent with Shavell (1982) results about the cost increase of liability for accidents that
arises when the liable party, instead of being risk neutral, is risk averse.
21 Note that (A1)–(A5) are all satisfie apart from interiority of the optimal efforts x1, x2 (since d91(0) Þ 0),
which can be reached through an ad hoc assumption on the parameters a, b, g, u0 and the sanction S.
22 Parameter b is not particularly meaningful for our analysis, since we are interested in comparing variations
of the optimal solutions rather than their values. Indeed, we do not introduce any measure of the effort; that is
its size (and therefore the magnitude of the disutility) could be anything.
23 Values of g close to one represent an efficien monitoring by the authority upon illegal behavior, while
values close to zero imply inefficien monitoring.
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In the following analysis we will show how the parameters a, b, g, u0, as well as the size
of the sanction S, affect the optimal efforts x1 and x2 in both models. In other words, our goal
is to study how specifi features of the agent (parameters a and b), as well as the parameters
controlled by the authority (g and the sanction S), determine whether the optimal effort in the
model with agent liability is larger or smaller than the optimal effort in the case under
principal liability. We shall see through an example that with different, but in both cases
reasonable, values for the parameters above, effort x2 can be either larger or smaller than
effort x1. We will then establish a condition under which the optimal effort in the model
where the agent is liable is not larger than the optimal effort in the model where the principal
is liable. This situation appears to be particularly attractive from the point of view of the
decision-maker since, with respect to the model where the principal is liable, the model based
on the agent liability exhibits not only the advantage of reducing the net benefi of the
principal discussed in the previous section, but also the advantage of an increased probability
of detection originated by a reduced effort in covering up the illegal action.
The exponential model allows for a direct computation of the optimal solutions (x1,r1) and
(x2,r2) under both legal regimes as solutions of the two systems of Eqs. (4) and (5)
respectively (see Privileggi et al. [1998]).
4.1. A numerical example
Table 1 presents a numerical example of the working of the exponential model, which
shows that the optimal effort x2 can be either larger or smaller
24 than effort x1, depending on
whether parameter g, which stands for the “average” probability of detection, assumes a low
or a high value.
This scenario should not be surprising, since it is not clear if, in the new legal regime, the
agent will maximize her utility through harder work (which reduces the probability of
detection) or, on the contrary, by reducing effort (when this would generate a “disutility
effect” larger than the positive effect upon the expected sanction).
This example anticipates what will be shown in the next subsection: the difference x2 2
x1 turns out to be a decreasing function of parameter g, that is, of the “average” probability
of detection. In particular, if g is large enough, this difference becomes negative, that is, x1
24 Similar examples (available from the authors upon request) can also be constructed with reference to cases
in which the principal loses the benefi when detected, while liability for sanctions is only partially shifted form
the principal to the agent.
Table 1
The exponential model: a numerical example
g r1 r2 x1 x2 p(x1) p(x2) p1 p2
0.3 0.1022 0.5653 0.5987 0.8292 0.1648 0.1309 0.7330 0.4347
0.8 0.1846 0.8239 0.9655 0.9317 0.3046 0.3151 0.5108 0.1761
Note: B 5 1, S 5 1, a 5 3, b 5 0.2, u0 5 0.1
191
. x2. Under certain conditions, a similar pattern will be observed whenever sanction S grows
larger. The interpretation of this situation may be the following: if the probability of
detection (or the sanction) is sufficientl high, the agent requires enough compensation from
the principal for the (high) risk of being detected to balance even a reduction in the effort of
hiding the illicit activity. From the principal’s point of view, this is equivalent to saying that
the cost of compensating the agent for his effort to hide the action becomes higher than the
cost of compensation for the risk of incurring the sanction.
This result is in line with the finding of the literature about self-protection activities
(Ehrlich & Becker [1972], Lee [1998]), that is, activities that reduce the probability of a loss.
Self-protection differs from insurance, which reduces the amount of the loss while not
changing its probability. While more risk-averse people ceteris paribus always prefer greater
insurance than the less risk-averse, the same is not true for self-protection. In fact self-
protection reduces the income both in favorable and unfavorable states of the world (as it
absorbs resources), while insurance increases income in the unfavorable states. Thus more
risk-averse people can demand either higher or lower self-protection than less risk-averse.
Quoting Shavell (1982, p. 1), who refers to liability for accidents, “Even though a risk averse
injurer has a greater motivation to reduce the probability of a loss than does a risk neutral
injurer, spending to reduce the probability exposes him to a larger risk (for if he loses l, his
fina income will be lower by l plus his expenditures).”
Our model shows that this classical result carries over to an agency model. In the
following we examine the factors which can induce the agent to choose a lower effort than
the principal, when liability is shifted from the latter to the former.
4.2. A comparative static analysis25
By using the explicit solutions for the optimal efforts x1, x2 obtained in Privileggi et al.
(1998), let us defin the difference x2 2 x1 as a function of the parameters of the model:
x2 2 x1 5 f~a,b,g,u0,S!. (7)
Proposition 3: Under the assumptions of the exponential model, function f define in
(7) is strictly decreasing with respect to g. As a consequence, variable g can be globally
explicited with respect to the other variables for f(a,b,g,u0,S) 5 0 obtaining the
implicit function
g*~a,b,u0,S! 5
1
b
~1 2 u0 1 b!
~eas 2 1 2 d!2
aS~2eaS 2 2 2 d!~eaS 2 1!
, (8)
that is, for each fixe a,b,u0,S, there exists a unique value g*(a,b,u0,S) for the parameter g
such that x1 5 x2.
Thanks to monotonicity of f with respect to g, the following corollary holds.
25 Proofs of all the statements in this subsection have been omitted. All technical details can be found in
Privileggi et al. (1998).
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Corollary: The inequality x1 $ x2, that is all the cases where the optimal effort in the
regime of agent liability is not larger than the optimal effort under principal liability, is
characterized by
x1 $ x2 N g $ g*~a,b,u0,S!.
This is in tune with the intuition given by our example: if the probability of detection is (on
average) large enough, switching the burden of liability from the principal to the agent causes a
reduction in the effort of hiding the wrongdoing, thus enhancing the probability of detection.
Now we study how changes in the parameters a,b,u0,S affect the threshold g* define in
(8). It is sufficien to study the sign of the partial derivatives of function g*(a,b,u0,S) with
respect to each parameter to see in which direction the threshold moves as the single
parameter increases.
Proposition 4: Given the assumptions of the exponential model, whenever x1 and x2 are
strictly positive the following hold:
2 ~i! Dbg*~a,b,u0S! and Du0g*~a,b,u0S! are always negative,
2 ~ii! Dag*~a,b,u0,S! and DSg*~a,b,u0,S! are both positive if
aS , 1.93 and both negative whenever aS . 1.93,
where Dag*, DSg*, Dbg* and Du0g* denote the partial derivatives of g*.
Negativity of the partial derivatives of g* with respect to b and u0 implies that the
threshold g* decreases as b or u0 increases; that is, as the cost of effort rises and/or the agent
becomes more demanding, a lower probability of detection is enough to switch from a
situation where x1 , x2 to the case where x1 . x2. In other words, positive variations in the
cost of effort and/or in the reservation utility of the agent act in favor of law enforcement
under the agent liability regime, since a smaller probability of detection is necessary to favor
a reduction in effort of hiding the wrongdoing with respect to the other legal regime.
Different is the case of variations of the threshold as either the absolute risk aversion of
the agent a or the sanction S increase. For small values of the product aS, an increase of a
and/or S shifts the threshold g* upward. That is, for low absolute risk aversion of the agent
and/or small sanctions, an increase of one or both of them has a negative effect (from the
point of view of the effective probability of detection) on law enforcement in the regime
which puts liability on the agent, thus making the other regime comparatively more efficient
The opposite happens for higher values of aS (greater than 1.93). In other words, the higher
the sanction (or the risk aversion) is, the more efficien the second legal regime becomes with
respect to the firs one through a further increase in the sanction (or the risk aversion) itself.
5. Conclusions
The results must be considered cautiously, as solvency of both the principal and the agent
was assumed and only the efficienc issue was examined. To relax the solvency assumption,
193
one should consider other policy devices, such as imprisonment as an alternative to fines
piercing of the corporate veil, and so forth. Examination of a very simplifie model, however,
has been useful in shedding light upon the main problems at stake.
The increase in the expected cost of illegal behavior seems to be the feature on which legal
systems focus when penalties for agents that perform illegal activities benefitin their
principal are devised. The beneficia effect of tightening the principal “moral” constraint is
confirme in this paper, in a setting where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk
averse. The legal regime in which the agent is liable reduces the principal’s net benefit thus
involving at the margin some exit from illegal behavior. These advantages must however be
assessed against the costs of burdening a risk averse agent with risk.
The case for shifting responsibility onto agents is also generally not clear-cut for another
reason: while it can provide a way of inducing some operators to renounce illegal behavior,
it can also worsen the problem of repressing those who still fin illegal behavior worthwhile.
Nevertheless, as we have shown in Section 4, it is not self-evident that the probability of
detection eventually decreases; there are also cases where the opposite occurs, and both the
greater cost for the principal and the reduced agent care in concealing the wrongdoing may
favor law enforcement. This case occurs, in our specifi model, when enforcement policy is
characterized by high values of either sanctions or probability of detection.26 Thus, under a
“strong” enforcement policy, the shift of the responsibility upon the agent is beneficial
although it could fail—and even produce adverse effects—if it is considered as a remedy for
insufficien public intervention.27 The agent liability may in fact be the most effective regime
in securing compliance, but specifi conditions must be met, as theoretical analysis has
shown. Particularly relevant for policy design is the case of strong enforcement through high
probabilities (instead of high penalties). While this is certainly a costly policy, its benefit
could be enhanced by shifting liability onto agents. Typical shortcomings of agent respon-
sibility (such as agent insolvency or inequity in income distribution) would be mitigated in
this case.
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